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DRAFT 081618 
 
THE BEAT AND TREATY OVERRIDES: 
A BRIEF RESPONSE TO ROSENBLOOM AND SHAHEEN 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1 
Bret Wells2 
 
In a recent paper posted on SSRN, Profs. David Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen argue that 
the Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) (IRC section 59A), as enacted in 2017, is a 
potential violation of Articles 23 and 24 of US tax treaties. In addition, they argue that the 
BEAT does not override those treaties and therefore the treaties can be relied upon to 
overcome the effects of the BEAT. As Rosenbloom and Shaheen conclude: 
 
Courts generally seek to resolve apparent conflicts between the Code and the 
treaties. They are reluctant to approve a statutory override of negotiated treaty 
provisions even when a conflict is found. We believe they would be even less 
inclined to do so in the absence of some indication that Congress intended that 
result with respect to a statute enacted under a special reconciliation procedure 
that did not contemplate treaty overrides, with legislative history affirmatively 
indicating an intention not to override, and with nothing to the contrary in the 
statutory text. We believe that the BEAT’s conflicts with the nondiscrimination 
provision and its reconcilable inconsistency with the foreign tax credit provision 
of U.S. treaties do not constitute treaty overrides. Therefore, for purposes of 
calculating the BEAT, deductions for otherwise deductible payments to 
related persons resident in treaty countries and foreign tax credits for 
foreign taxes paid to treaty countries should be allowed.3  
 
In our opinion, this conclusion is wrong, for two reasons. First, we believe that the BEAT 
is not a treaty violation. Second, we believe that even if the BEAT were found to violate 
treaties, it is a treaty override. 
 
1. The	BEAT	Does	Not	Violate	US	Tax	Treaties.		As	Rosenbloom	and	Shaheen	argue,	the	BEAT	potentially	violates	two	articles	of	US	tax	treaties,	article	23	(granting	a	foreign	tax	credit)	and	article	24	(non-discrimination).	However,	in	our	opinion	neither	provision	is	violated	by	the	BEAT.		
                                               1	Irwin	I.	Cohn	Professor	of	Law	and	Director,	International	Tax	LLM,	the	University	of	Michigan.		2	George	Butler	Research	Professor	and	Professor	of	Law,	University	of	Houston	Law	Center.	3Rosenbloom,	H.	David	and	Shaheen,	Fadi,	The	BEAT	and	the	Treaties	(August	2018).	Available	at	SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229532	(emphasis	added).	
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Article	23	requires	the	US	to	grant	a	foreign	tax	credit	for	certain	foreign	taxes:		 In	accordance	with	the	provisions	and	subject	to	the	limitations	of	the	
law	of	the	United	States	(as	it	may	be	amended	from	time	to	time	
without	changing	the	general	principle	hereof),	the	United	States	shall	allow	to	a	resident	or	citizen	of	the	United	States	as	a	credit	against	the	United	States	tax	on	income	applicable	to	residents	and	citizens:			 a) the	income	tax	paid	or	accrued	to	__________	by	or	on	behalf	of	such	resident	or	citizen;	and			b) in	the	case	of	a	United	States	company	owning	at	least	10	percent	of	the	voting	stock	of	a	company	that	is	a	resident	of	__________	and	from	which	the	United	States	company	receives	dividends,	the	income	tax	paid	or	accrued	to	__________	by	or	on	behalf	of	the	payor	with	respect	to	the	profits	out	of	which	the	dividends	are	paid.4		
 	The	BEAT	is	a	“limitation”	of	the	foreign	tax	credit	because	it	does	not	allow	foreign	tax	credits	against	BEAT	tax	liability.	Nor	does	the	BEAT	change	the	“general	principle”	of	the	foreign	tax	credit	because	credits	in	general	are	available	for	foreign	taxes	imposed	on	foreign	source	income.	The	BEAT	instead	imposes	a	US	tax	on	US	source	income	(the	interest	and	royalties	paid	to	the	foreign	related	party).	Since	1921,	the	US	foreign	tax	credit	has	been	limited	to	only	foreign	source	income.5		No	“general	principle”	of	the	foreign	tax	credit	is	violated	when	the	BEAT	is	applied	to	protect	the	US	corporate	tax	at	source.6					What	is	more,	the	United	Stated,	for	many	years	prior	to	the	enactment	of	Section	59A	in	2017,	had	interpreted	a	predecessor	alternative	minimum	tax	regime	(old	Section	59)	that	did	not	allow	a	foreign	tax	credit	to	be	fully	utilized	to	reduce	the	corporate	alternative	minimum	tax	liability.7		The	IRS	has	had	a	longstanding	position	that	old	Section	59’s	limitation	on	
                                               4	US	Model	Income	Tax	Treaty	(2016),	Art.	23.		5	See	REVENUE	ACT	OF	1921,	CH.	136,	§	222(A)(5),	238(A),	904(A),	42	STAT.	227,	249,	258.		6	Arguably,	however,	a	“general	principle”	was	violated	by	the	elimination	of	IRC	section	902,	the	indirect	credit,	and	the	substitution	of	a	limited	participation	exemption.	In	our	opinion	this	was	a	treaty	override.	Similarly,	the	limitation	of	the	FTC	to	80%	of	foreign	tax	under	GILTI	may	be	a	treaty	override.	For	a	contrary	argument	see	Shaviro,	Daniel,	The	New	Non-Territorial	U.S.	International	Tax	System,	Part	1	(July	2,	2018).	Tax	Notes,	Vol.	160,	No.	1,	July	2,	2018;	NYU	Law	and	Economics	Research	Paper	No.	18-23.	Available	at	SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222660.	7	See	I.R.C.	§59a)(2)(A)	(2004).		
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the	ability	to	utilize	foreign	tax	credits	under	the	predecessor	alternative	minimum	tax	regime	were	compliant	with	Article	23	because	of	the	bolded	language	set	forth	above.	8		The	Tax	Court	has	also	held	that	the	further	restriction	on	the	availability	of	the	foreign	tax	credit	relief	under	a	generally	applicable	alternative	minimum	tax	regime	did	not	violate	U.S.	tax	treaties.		In	Pekar	v.	Commissioner,	9	the	Tax	Court	held,	inter	alia,	that	the	limitations	on	the	availability	of	US	foreign	tax	credit	relief	under	old	Section	59	did	not	violate	Article	23’s	relief	from	double	taxation	provision	under	the	U.S.-U.K.	tax	treaty.		Relying	on	the	bolded	language	set	forth	above,	the	Tax	Court	stated	as	follows:	Article	23	of	the	U.S.-U.K.	treaty	generally	prohibits	double	taxation	and	provides	to	U.S.	residents	and	citizens	a	credit	against	their	U.S.	income	tax	in	an	“appropriate	amount”.	U.S.-U.K.	treaty,	art.	23(1).	An	“appropriate	amount”	is	defined	as	that	amount	of	tax	paid	to	the	United	Kingdom,	not	to	exceed	the	limitations	provided	by	U.S.	law	for	that	taxable	year.	Id.	One	of	the	limitations	for	the	1995	
taxable	year	was	the	foreign	tax	credit	limitation	of	
section	59.	Therefore,	the	U.S.-U.K.	treaty	provides	for	
the	imposition	of	the	tax	credit	limit,	and	the	treaty	and	
the	Code	may	be	harmonized	and	the	limit	applied	to	
petitioner.10			In	dealing	with	this	language,	however,	Professors	Rosenbloom	and	Shaheen	are	dismissive,	stating	that:	“It	is	possible,	in	other	circumstances,	to	ponder	the	precise	meaning	of	the	quoted	words,	but	there	is	no	need	to	do	that	with	respect	to	the	BEAT.	It	envisions	no	statutory	foreign	tax	credit	at	all,	and	that	is	surely	inconsistent	with	the	“general	principle”	of	Article	23,	whatever	the	contours	of	that	principle	may	be.”11	The	error	in	their	thinking	can	be	demonstrated	by	the	following	hypothetical.		Suppose	that	the	BEAT	had	applied	a	tax	rate	equal	to	the	regular	corporate	tax	rate	of	21%	tax	but	then	had	provided	that	foreign	tax	credit	relief	could	not	offset	more	than	11	points	of	the	tax	computed	under	Section	59A.		In	that	situation,	the	minimum	tax	under	this	hypothetical	regime	would	have	
                                               8	See	FSA	200110019	(Dec.	6,	2001).		9	See	Pekar	v.	Commissioner,		113	T.C.	158	(1999).		10	See	Pekar	v.	Commissioner,		113	T.C.	at	162	(emphasis	added).	The	Tax	Court	has	continued	to	rely	on	this	reasoning	in	later	decisions,	thus	representing	a	longstanding	view.		See	Brooke	v.	Commissioner,	T.C.	Memo.	2000-194,	79	T.C.M.	(CCH)	2206	(2000),	aff’d	13	Fed.	Appx.	7	(D.C.	Cir.	2001).	11	See	Rosenbloom,	H.	David	and	Shaheen,	Fadi,	The	BEAT	and	the	Treaties	at	3	(August	2018).	Available	at	SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229532.	
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preserved	residual	U.S.	taxation	equal	to	10%		in	all	events,	but	“in	form”	this	hypothetical	regime	allows	foreign	tax	credit	relief	of	some	amount.		In	relevant	part	to	this	analysis,	this	hypothetical	regime	is	functionally	equivalent	to	what	Congress	enacted	in	Section	59A.		Said	differently,	Section	59A	provides	a	concessionary	rate	of	tax	but	restricts	further	foreign	tax	credit	relief	that	does	provide	a	benefit	under	the	corporate	tax	rate	to	save	the	US	taxing	jurisdiction	over	the	tax	liability	computed	under	the	concessionary	rate	of	tax.		The	formalistic	distinction	does	not	change	the	substantive	reality	that	more	than	half	of	the	regular	tax	liability	could	be	offset	by	US	foreign	tax	credit	relief.		The	Supreme	Court	recently	applied	such	an	functional	economic	equivalency	argument	in	the	foreign	tax	credit	context	in	PPL	v.	Commissioner	12	where	the	Supreme	Court	unanimously	held	that	the	substance	of	the	impact	of	a	foreign	tax	regime	was	to	be	considered	to	determine	its	import	under	US	tax	law.		Under	the	logic	employed	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	the	PPL	case,	the	Court	should	find	that	a	US	tax	regime	that	provides	for	a	reduced	tax	rate	with	no	foreign	tax	credit	relief	is	functionally	similar	to	an	alternative	minimum	tax	regime	that	initially	provides	for	a	full	rate	of	tax	and	partially	disallows	usage	of	credits.		If	the	latter	is	acceptable	as	Professors	Rosenbloom	and	Shaheen	accept,	then	the	former	substantively	equivalent	regime	is	as	well.			Thus,	Professors	Rosenbloom’s	or	Shaheen’s		dismissiveness	would	only	be	relevant	if	Section	59A	had	applied	an	alternative	minimum	tax	at	the	regular	corporate	tax	rate	of	21%,	and	had	denied	US	foreign	tax	credit	relief	in	that	situation,	but	again	that	is	not	what	Section	59A	does	in	fact	or	in	substance.		In	our	view,	a	court	can	easily	understand	the	phrase	“subject	to	
the	limitations	of	the	law	of	the	United	States	(as	it	may	be	
amended	from	time	to	time	without	changing	the	general	
principle	hereof”	to	mean	that	the	usage	of	US	foreign	tax	credit	relief	is	subject	to	the	provisions	and	limitations	of	US	law	of	which	Section	59A	is	included—just	like	the	Tax	Court	has	already	done	with	respect	to	old	Section	59	in	Pekar	v.	Commissioner.		The	natural	reading	of	Article	23	employed	by	the	Tax	Court	in	Pekar	v.	Commissioner	harmonized	old	Section	59’s	application	with	US	tax	treaty	obligations,	and	it	is	faithful	to	the	intended	flexibility	that	was	intended	to	be	retained	by	the	United	States	under	Article	23	to	allow	it	to	enact	domestic	limitations	on	the	availability	of	US	foreign	tax	credit	relief	without	running	afoul	of	Article	23.			In	addition,	as	Rosenbloom	and	Shaheen	explain,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	that	the	BEAT	is	a	covered	income	tax	for	purposes	of	the	treaties.	The	BEAT	functions	as	an	alternative	minimum	tax,	and	its	base	is	different	than	
                                               12	PPL	v.	Commissioner,	569	U.S.	329	(2013).	
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that	of	the	income	tax	(so	that	it	would	not	be	considered	an	income	tax	under	IRC	section	901,	because	it	is	not	imposed	on	net	income).	13	This	is	what	Mr.	Barthold	seems	to	have	had	in	mind	in	his	answer	to	the	question	whether	the	BEAT	is	a	treaty	override:					 And	I	believe	in	particular	you	were	talking	about	the	proposed	base	erosion	anti-abuse	provision	of	the	chairman’s	mark.	And	it	is	
structured	as	an	alternative	tax	compared	to	the	income	tax.	So	I	think	our	view	is	that	there	is	not	a	treaty	override	inherent	in	that	design.14		
 Even	if	Chief	of	Staff	Barthold	believed	the	BEAT	were	a	covered	tax,	he	could	well	have	believed	that	Section	59A	is	not	a	treaty	override	(as	we	so	believe)	because	of	the	flexibility	and	authority	retained	under	Article	23	to	“subject	
[foreign	tax	credit	relief]	to	the	limitations	of	the	law	of	the	United	
States	(as	it	may	be	amended	from	time	to	time	without	changing	the	
general	principle	hereof).”		Given	the	breadth	of	this	language,	it	certainly	is	plausible	to	believe	that	Chief	of	Staff	Barthold	did	not	think	a	treaty	
                                               13	While	the	AMT	has	been	considered	a	covered	tax,	e.g.,	in	Kappus	v.	Commissioner,	337	F.3d	1053	(D.C.	Cir.	2003),	courts	have	not	addressed	this	issue	directly.	In	the	UK,	HMRC	believes	that	the	Diverted	Profits	Tax	(which	has	a	function	similar	to	the	BEAT)	is	not	covered	(and	so	cannot	be	overridden)	by	double	tax	treaties	because	it	is	not	‘substantially	similar’	to	corporation	tax	and	the	UK’s	domestic	law	does	not	apply	double	tax	treaties	to	DPT.	A	further	argument	is	that,	as	an	anti-avoidance	measure,	DPT	is	consistent	with	the	spirit	and	purpose	of	the	UK’s	double	tax	treaties.	See,	e.g.,	Avi-Yonah,	Reuven	S.,	Three	Steps	Forward,	One	Step	Back?	Reflections	on	'Google	Taxes',	BEPS,	and	the	DBCT	(May	24,	2016).	U	of	Michigan	Law	&	Econ	Research	Paper	No.	16-016;	U	of	Michigan	Public	Law	Research	Paper	No.	516.	Available	at	SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=2783858	or	http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2783858;	Dan	Neidle,	The	Diverted	Profits	Tax:	Flawed	by	Design?	2015	British	Tax	Review	147	(2015).;	Heather	Self,	The	UK’s	New	Diverted	Profit	Tax:	Compliance	with	EU	Law,	43	Intertax	333	(2015);	Jonathan	Peacock,	U.K.’s	Diverted	Profits	Tax:	A	Regime	Much,	Much	Broader	Than	its	True	Target?	17	European	Tax	Service	4	(2015).	7	Sol	Picciotto,	The	U.K.’s	Diverted	Profits	Tax:	An	Admission	of	Defeat	or	a	Pre-Emptive	Strike?,	Tax	Notes	International	239	(January	19,	2015);	Paul	Rutherford,	The	U.K.’s	Google	Tax-	First	Thoughts,	42	Tax	Planning	International	Review	4	(2015);	Luca	Cerioni,	The	New	“Google	Tax”:	The	“Beginning	of	the	End”	for	Tax	Residence	as	a	Connecting	Factor	for	Tax	Jurisdiction?	European	Taxation	185	(May,	2015);	Philip	Baker,	Diverted	Profits	Tax:	A	Partial	Response,	2015	British	Tax	Review	167	(2015)	(the	writer	advised	HMRC	on	the	compatibility	of	the	DPT	with	EU	law	and	tax	treaties). 	14	Barthold,	quoted	in	Rosenbloom	&	Shaheen,	supra.	As	explained	below,	this	is	not	a	statement	of	Congressional	intent.		
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override	was	necessary	for	the	BEAT	to	apply.		However,	Professors	Rosenbloom	and	Shaheen	take	from	this	single	statement	the	idea	that	the	BEAT	cannot	have	an	application	that	reduces	the	allowance	of	double	tax	relief,	stating	as	follows:	Whatever	[Mr.	Barthold’s]	reasons,	the	conclusion	—	that	the	BEAT	was	not	a	treaty	override	—	may	be	all	that	matters.		If	that	was	the	working	assumption	of	Congress,	it	would	not	have	intended	for	the	BEAT	to	override	treaties.	Professors	Rosenbloom	and	Shaheen	then	simply	conclude	that	the	BEAT	does	not	provide	a	foreign	tax	credit	limitation	at	all	and	do	so	without	addressing	the	fact	that	Article	23	does	not	require	such	a	reading	and	without	answering	why	the	BEAT	is	a	covered	tax.		Thus,	we	do	not	believe	that	BEAT	is	a	violation	of	Article	23,	because	(a)	it	may	not	be	a	covered	tax,	and	(b)	even	if	it	is	a	covered	tax,	it	is	a	limitation	on	the	foreign	tax	credit	that	is	consistent	with	its	general	principles	of	allowing	a	US	tax	credit	against	foreign	taxes	on	foreign	source	income.			As	for	Article	24,	we	have	explained	elsewhere	why	we	do	not	believe	the	BEAT	violates	non-discrimination.	First,	the	BEAT	applies	to	payments	from	US	parents	to	foreign	subsidiaries,	so	it	is	not	limited	to	payments	by	foreign	multinationals.	This	in	our	mind	is	the	most	important	point	because	it	means	that	both	foreign	and	US	multinationals	are	adversely	affected	by	the	BEAT.	Second,	the	BEAT	is	not	different	from	the	old	earnings	stripping	rule	(IRC	163(j))	which	is	similar	to	the	thin	capitalization	rules	adopted	by	other	countries,	and	is	an	accepted	exception	to	non-discrimination	that	is	needed	to	protect	the	US	tax	base.	Third,	the	BEAT	is	not	equivalent	to	a	denial	of	a	deduction	because	the	BEAT	rate	is	10%	and	a	denial	of	a	deduction	would	have	increased	tax	by	21%.	Finally,	foreign	related	parties	are	simply	not	comparable	to	US	related	parties	because	the	former	are	not	subject	to	US	taxing	jurisdiction	while	the	latter	are.15		
 
2. The	BEAT	as	a	Treaty	Override.	
	Even	if	the	BEAT	were	found	to	be	inconsistent	with	US	tax	treaties,	in	our	opinion	it	overrides	them.	
 
                                               15	Avi-Yonah,	Reuven	S.,	Beat	It:	Tax	Reform	and	Tax	Treaties	(January	4,	2018).	U	of	Michigan	Public	Law	Research	Paper	No.	587;	U	of	Michigan	Law	&	Econ	Research	Paper	No.	18-003.	Available	at	SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096879	or	http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3096879;	Wells,	Bret,	Get	With	the	BEAT	(February	19,	2018).	Tax	Notes,	February	19,	2018,	p.	1023.;	U	of	Houston	Law	Center	No.	2018-A-4.	Available	at	SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=3143891.	
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The U.S. position on treaty overrides can be summarized as follows.16 Under the 
U.S. Constitution, "Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."17 This “Supremacy Clause” 
was intended to ensure the supremacy of both U.S. federal laws and treaties to 
state laws, and was one of the major innovations in the Constitution.  
 
On its face, the Supremacy Clause says nothing about the relationship between 
treaties and federal laws, and it is not at all clear whether it should ever have been 
interpreted as the basis for treaty overrides. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
for a long time held otherwise, deciding that under the Supremacy Clause treaties 
and laws are equal and therefore the principle of lex posterior (i.e., a later law 
abrogates a prior contrary law) prevails.18 In 1888, in a case that discussed the 
relationship between a treaty that gave most favored nation status and a later 
statute imposing tariffs, the Court held that in resolving a clear conflict between a 
treaty and a federal statute, "[t]he duty of the courts is to construe and give effect 
to the latest expression of the sovereign will."19 And in 1957 the Court made its 
position even clearer, stating that "[a]n Act of Congress, which must comply with 
the Constitution, is on a full parity with a treaty, and ... when a statute which is 
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict 
renders the treaty null."20  
 
The general U.S. rule is therefore that any statute that is later in time than a treaty, 
and that conflicts with it in some way, is a treaty override. This rule could have 
led to hundreds of tax treaty overrides each year, given the frequency of U.S. tax 
legislation. But even the Senate Report does not go so far, explaining that the 
courts generally strive to construe statutes to avoid treaty overrides: "[t]he 
cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored. Where there are two 
acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible.... [T]he 
intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest."21 The same 
principle applies in the case of a treaty and a later statute: "When the two relate to 
the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give 
effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either."22 "A 
treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute 
unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed."23 
                                               16	See	generally	Senate	Report	100-445,	100th	Cong.,	2nd	Sess.,	Tit.	I,	XII	H.	1	(Relationship	with	Treaties),	explaining	sec.	112(aa)	of	S.	2238	(IRC	sec.	7852)	(the	“Senate	Report”). 			17	18	U.S.	Const.	art.	VI,	cl.	2. 	18	1	W.	Blackstone,	Commentaries	*89.	19	Whitney	v.	Robertson,	124	U.S.	190,	195	(1888).	20	Reid	v.	Covert,	354	U.S.	1,	18	(1957).	21	Posadas	v.	National	City	Bank,	296	U.S.	497,	503	(1936).		22	Whitney	v.	Robertson,	124	U.S.	at	194.	23	Cook	v.	United	States,	288	U.S.	102,	120	(1933).	
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However, the Senate Report also makes clear that when a clear conflict does exist, 
a treaty override will result: “Prior judicial efforts to find consistency between 
earlier and later statutes and treaties illustrate the difficulties of determining when 
application of the general later-in-time rule should result in giving effect only to 
the later provision; however, these difficulties cannot be permitted to obscure the 
fact that if an actual conflict does exist concerning a matter within the scope of 
both an earlier treaty and a later statute, as properly construed, the later statute 
prevails.”24  
 
Moreover, this result obtains even where there is no evidence in the law or its 
legislative history that a treaty override was intended. The Senate Report’s 
statement in this regard fully sets out the theory underlying the U.S. position, and 
it is thus worth quoting in full: 
  
Notwithstanding Congress' intent that the [1986 Tax Reform] Act and 
income tax treaties be construed harmoniously to the extent possible, 
conflicts other than those addressed in this bill or in the Act ultimately 
may be found or alleged to exist. Similarly, conflicts between treaties and 
other acts of Congress affecting revenue are likely to be found or alleged 
to exist in the future, either with respect to existing or future treaties and 
statutes. The bill provides that for purpose of determining the relationship 
between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting 
revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by 
reason of its being a treaty or a law. In adopting this rule, the committee 
intends to permanently codify (with respect to tax-related provisions) 
present law to the effect that canons of construction applied by the courts 
to the interaction of two statutes enacted at different times apply also in 
construing the interactions of revenue statutes and treaties enacted and 
entered into at different times. The committee does not intend this 
codification to alter the initial presumption of harmony between, for 
example, earlier treaties and later statutes. Thus, for example, the bill 
continues to allow an earlier ratified treaty provision to continue in effect 
where there is not an actual conflict between that treaty provision and a 
subsequent revenue statute (i.e., where it is consistent with the intent of 
each provision to interpret them in a way that gives effect to both). Nor 
does the committee intend that this codification blunt in any way the 
superiority of the latest expression of the sovereign will in cases involving 
actual conflicts, where that expression appears in a treaty or a statute. . . .  
 
Although the committee believes that the bill's provision regarding the 
equal status of treaties and statutes merely codifies present law, the 
committee believes that this provision, and the bill's disclosure provision, 
are necessary technical corrections to the Act for several reasons. The 
                                               24	Senate	Report,	supra.	
8
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 157 [2018]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/157
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3232974 
committee is concerned that the relationship of the tax laws and treaties is 
misunderstood. The internal tax laws of most countries provide some sort 
of regime for taxing either the foreign income of domestic persons, the 
domestic income of foreign persons, or both. Either type of income, then, 
is potentially subject to two autonomous tax systems each of which is at 
best designed to mesh with other tax systems only in broad general terms. 
Double taxation of the same income, or taxation of certain income by 
neither system, can potentially result. Income tax treaties, in the 
committee's view, are agreements that provide the mechanism for 
coordinating two identified tax systems by reference to their particular 
provisions and the particular tax policies they reflect, and which have as 
their primary objectives is a desirable goal that serves to improve the long 
term environment for commercial and financial dealings between residents 
of the treaty partners.  
 
The committee believes that when a treaty partner's internal tax laws and 
policies change, treaty provisions designed and bargained to coordinate 
the predecessor laws and policies must be reviewed for purposes of 
determining how those provisions apply under the changed circumstances. 
The committee recognizes that there are cases where giving continued 
effect to a particular treaty provision does not conflict with the policy of a 
particular statutory change. In certain other cases, however, a mismatch 
between an existing treaty provision and a newly-enacted law may exist, 
in which case the continued effect of the treaty provision may frustrate the 
policy of the new internal law. In some cases the continued effect of the 
existing treaty provision would be to give an unbargained-for benefit to 
taxpayers or one of the treaty partners. At that point, the treaty provision 
in question may no longer eliminate double taxation or prevent fiscal 
evasion; if not, its intended purpose would no longer be served.  
 
The committee recognizes that some would prefer that existing treaties be 
conformed to changing U.S. tax policy solely by treaty renegotiation. 
However, the committee notes that in recent years, U.S. tax laws have 
been constantly changing. Moreover, once U.S. tax policy has changed, 
the existence of an unbargained-for benefit created by the change would 
have the effect of making renegotiation to reflect current U.S. tax policy 
extremely difficult, because the other country may have little or no 
incentive to remove an unbargained-for benefit whose cost is borne by the 
United States.  
 
The committee recognizes that the parties to the treaty can differ as to 
whether the continued effect of a treaty provision in light of a particular 
statutory change provides such an unbargained-for benefit or otherwise 
frustrates the basic objectives of tax treaties. Remedies may be available in 
the case of what one party views as a breach of international law. 
However, the committee believes that under the constitutional system of 
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government of the United States, where tax laws must be passed by both 
Houses of Congress and signed by the President, and where it is the role of 
the courts to decide the constitutionality of the laws and what the laws 
mean, it is not the role of taxpayers, the Judicial branch, or the Executive 
branch to determine that constitutionally valid statutes that actually 
conflict with earlier treaties ought not to be given effect either because of 
views of international law or for any other reason.  
 
The committee is concerned that there are some who assert that 
treaties receive preferential treatment in their interaction with 
statutes. The committee is further concerned that whatever support is 
found for this view is based on misinterpretations of authoritative 
pronouncements on the subject. For example, before original 
introduction of this technical corrections legislation, the Internal Revenue 
Service announced that new Code section 367(e)(2), discussed above, 
which imposes corporate-level tax in certain liquidations, would not apply 
where it "would violate a treaty non-discrimination provision" (Notice 87–
5, 1987–1 C.B. 416). Eventually, the Internal Revenue Service withdrew 
its notice on a prospective basis, and concluded that no treaty conflict 
existed (Notice 87–66, 1987–2 C.B. 376). The committee is concerned 
that the language used in the original notice may have suggested an 
erroneous inference that, had section 367(e)(2) actually created a conflict 
in a particular case, it would have been given no effect under the terms of 
the original Notice. Normal application of the later-in-time rule would not 
permit this result.  
 
Other examples exist where the committee is troubled with erroneous 
inferences that have apparently been drawn from language used by the 
Executive branch. For example, in Revenue Ruling 80–223, 1980–2 C.B. 
217, the Service considered the issue of whether foreign tax credit 
provisions enacted in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (sections 901(f) and 
907) prevailed over conflicting provisions in earlier treaties that provide 
for foreign tax credits determined pursuant to the foreign tax credit 
provisions of the Code in effect as of dates specified in such treaties. The 
analysis stated the following:  
 
In Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), subsequent inconsistent 
legislation was held not to supersede an earlier treaty provision because 
neither the committee reports nor the debates on the subsequent legislation 
mentioned the earlier treaty. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the 
legislative history underlying the enactment of sections 901(f) and 907 of 
the Code for a clear indication from Congress as to whether it intended 
these sections to supersede any provision of treaties entered into prior to 
the enactment of these sections.  
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The committee believes it would be erroneous to assert that the 
absence of legislative history mentioning a treaty was sufficient to 
reach the result in Cook. That case dealt with the question of how to 
construe an anti-bootlegger provision (section 581 of the Tariff Act of 
1930) that first became law in an act (the Tariff Act of 1922) passed early 
on during Prohibition. Section 581 of the 1930 Act was a verbatim 
reenactment of section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922. The scope of section 
581 of the 1922 Act had been limited by a U.S.-Great Britain treaty made 
in 1924. The case came before the Supreme Court as Prohibition was in 
the last stages of being written out of the Constitution. The Court reached 
its conclusion on the stated ground that the treaty limit continued to apply 
under the 1930 Act, because section 581, "with its scope narrowed by the 
Treaty, remained in force after its re-enactment in the Act of 1930." 288 
U.S. at 120. Properly construed, therefore, the committee believes that 
Cook stands not for the proposition that Congress must specifically advert 
to treaties to have later statutes given effect, but that for purposes of 
interpreting a reenacted statute, it may be appropriate for some purposes to 
treat the statute as if its effect was continuous and unbroken from the date 
of its original enactment.  
 
Similarly the committee believes it would be erroneous to assert that an 
income tax statute such as the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 prevails over 
treaties only if treaty interactions are mentioned in the statute or legislative 
history. On the other hand, the committee believes that any such mention, 
if made, would be dispositive.  
 
In view of what the committee believes is the correct treatment of 
treaty-statute interactions, then, the committee finds it disturbing that 
some assert that a treaty prevails over later enacted conflicting 
legislation in the absence of an explicit statement of congressional 
intent to override the treaty; that it is treaties, not legislation, which 
will prevail in the event of a conflict absent an explicit and specific 
legislative override. The committee does not believe this view has any 
foundation in present law. Moreover, the committee believes that it is not 
possible to insert an explicit statement addressing each specific conflict 
arising from a particular act in the act or its legislative history; for in the 
committee's view, it is not possible for Congress to assure itself that all 
conflicts, actual or potential, between existing treaties and proposed 
legislation have been identified during the legislative process of enacting a 
particular amendment to the tax laws. In the absence of a clear statement 
that legislation prevails over prior treaties, dubious tax avoidance 
schemes, in the committee's view, have been suggested. See, e.g., Tax 
Notes, March 9, 1987, at 1004, improperly suggesting that the failure to 
clarify the relationship between the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 
and earlier treaties allows foreigners to own and operate U.S. business tax-
free.  
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The committee believes that a basic problem that gives rise to the need for 
a clarification of the equality of statutes and treaties is the complexity 
arising from the interaction of the Code, treaties, and foreign laws taken as 
a whole. The committee notes that the United States has over 35 income 
tax treaties, some of extreme complexity, plus additional treaties bearing 
on income tax issues. In addition, the application of United States tax law 
to complex business transactions exacerbates these complexities. The 
committee does not believe that Congress can either actually or 
theoretically know in advance all of the implications for each treaty, or the 
treaty system, of changes in domestic law, and therefore Congress cannot 
at the time it passes each tax bill address all potential treaty conflict issues 
raised by that bill. This complexity, and the resulting necessary gaps in 
Congressional foreknowledge about treaty conflicts, make it difficult for 
the committee to be assured that its tax legislative policies are given effect 
unless it is confident that where they conflict with existing treaties, they 
will nevertheless prevail.  
 
The committee further believes that codification of this rule, together with 
the disclosure requirements in the bill, will lead to the early discovery of 
now-unknown treaty conflicts and to their appropriate resolution. If any 
case actually arises in which proper application of the canons of 
construction ultimately reveals an actual conflict, the committee expects 
that full legislative consideration of that conflict will take place to 
determine whether application of the general later-in-time rule is 
consistent with the spirit of the treaty (namely, to prevent double taxation 
by an agreed division of taxing jurisdiction, and to prevent fiscal evasion) 
and the proper expectations of the treaty partners.25 
 
Against this strong legislative history, it is hard to argue, as Rosenbloom and 
Shaheen do in reliance on Cook, that the absence of a clear statement of 
Congressional intent means that the BEAT does not override treaties. If this were 
presented to a court, in our opinion the court would not find the BEAT to be a 
treaty violation for the reasons stated above. But if the court were to consider the 
BEAT a treaty violation, it is hard to envisage it as concluding that the treaties 
should defeat the clear intent of the BEAT, which is to protect the US tax base by 
limiting the affected deductions and to not allow a foreign tax credit against the 
                                               25	Senate	Report,	supra	(emphases	added).		The	above	legislative	history	for	tax	legislation	is	consistent	with	broader	scholarship	on	how	unambiguous	later-in-time	legislation	should	be	understood	as	overruling	earlier	treaty	provisions.		See	Andrew	H.	Bean,	Constraining	Charming	Betsy:	Textual	Ambiguity	as	a	Predicate	to	Applying	the	Charming	Betsy	Doctrine,	2015	B.Y.U.	L.	Rev.	1801	
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BEAT. Certainly, Mr. Barthold’s ambiguous statement cannot be relied on for this 
purpose since he is not a member of Congress.26  
 
Moreover, allowing treaties (and especially the non-discrimination article) to 
overcome the BEAT would be to completely defeat the purpose of the legislation. 
Any taxpayer would be able to re-structure their affairs so that payments that are 
covered by the BEAT would be made to affiliates resident in treaty countries, and 
soon the BEAT would have no bite at all. 
 
Perhaps most relevant to this discussion is the substantial line of US cases that 
have addressed the predecessor to Section 59A and its interpretation with existing 
US treaties, namely old Section 59.  In Kappus v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 1053 
(D.C. Cir., 2003), the Court of Appeals addressed old Section 59’s restriction on 
the ability to use foreign tax credits under the predecessor to Section 59A’s 
alternative minimum tax regime.  In Kappus, the Court of Appeals held 
unanimously that the 90% limitation on the foreign tax credit enacted by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 overrode the US Canada Tax Treaty (1984) despite the 
absence of evidence of Congressional intent to override in the legislative history 
of the 1986 act.27  The court held that: 
 
The question of whether the Treaty and statute can be harmonized as the 
government suggests is an extremely close one.   It is not, however, a 
                                               26	A	stronger	indication	of	Congressional	intent	may	be	derived	from	(a)	the	question	posed	to	Mr.	Barthold,	which	suggests	that	Congress	intended	the	BEAT	to	apply	even	if	it	were	a	treaty	override,	(b)	a	hearing	of	the	Senate	Finance	Committee	on	October	3,	2017,	in	which	one	of	us	testified	to	the	urgent	need	to	protect	the	US	tax	base	even	if	it	meant	overriding	the	treaties.	The	US	has	a	long	history	of	treaty	overrides.	See,	e.g.,	IRC	section	897	(FIRPTA),	884	(branch	profit	tax,	which	overrode	treaties	by	applying	the	“qualified	resident”	rule),	894(c),	and	163(j)	(which	despite	its	nominal	application	to	tax	exempt	related	parties	was	universally	understood	to	apply	only	to	foreigners	and	thus	arguably	to	override	article	24(4)).	See	generally	Avi-Yonah,	Reuven	S.,	Tax	Treaty	Overrides:	A	Qualified	Defense	of	Us	Practice	(October	12,	2005).	Available	at	SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=829746	or	http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.829746.			27	Kappus	v.	Commissioner,	337	F.3d	1053	(D.C.	Cir.	2003).	In	Owner–Operator	Independent	Drivers	Ass'n,	Inc.	v.	United	States	Departmentof	Transportation,	No.	12–1264	(D.C.	Cir.	2013),	the	DC	Circuit	refused	to	allow	a	general	statute	requiring	truck	drivers	to	have	a	medical	certificate	to	override	an	earlier	executive	agreement	with	Mexico	exempting	Mexican	drivers	from	such	a	requirement	absent	clear	evidence	of	Congressional	intent.		We	think	this	case	is	distinguishable,	because	there	was	no	indication	Congress	considered	the	Mexico	executive	agreement	when	it	enacted	the	general	statute,	while	in	the	case	of	BEAT,	Congress	clearly	was	aware	of	the	potential	override	issue	presented	by	the	BEAT,	given	the	question	Barthold	answered.		
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question that we need resolve.   The Kappuses concede that, even if their 
reading of the Treaty is correct and the Treaty and § 59(a)(2) are in 
irreconcilable conflict, the statute nonetheless would control their tax 
liability if it were the most recent relevant provision.   Accordingly, 
because we conclude in Part III that the statute is in fact the last relevant 
provision, we need not further pursue the search for harmony.   See South 
African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 125-26 (D.C.Cir.1987) (assuming 
arguendo the existence of a conflict between a treaty and a statute, and 
resolving the case on the basis of the last-in-time principle);  Jamieson v. 
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1372, 1373-74 (Tax 
Ct.1995) (holding, in a case prior to the amending protocols, that § 
59(a)(2) prevailed over the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty under the last-in-time 
principle without determining whether they were in conflict), aff'd, 132 
F.3d 1481 (D.C.Cir.1997). 
 
It is true that the court relied in part on a general clarification in TAMRA (1988) 
that Congress intended to override the treaties when enacting 1986 act.  But that 
clarification was not specific to the 90% limit, and in any case was subsequent to 
the 1986 act and not part of its legislative history. Thus, Kappus stands for the 
proposition that when a conflict between a treaty and a statute clearly exists, the 
latter in time rule is dispositive even in the absence of legislative history, and 
even when the override is a clear violation of the spirit of the treaty (which in our 
opinion the BEAT is not).   
Professors Rosenbloom and Shaheen fail to address the holding of Lindsey 
v. Commissioner,28 albeit they do cite this case in a string cite.  In Lindsey v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court was confronted with whether the alternative 
minimum tax regime under Section 59 that did not allow for full usage of US 
foreign tax credit relief violated the U.S. treaty obligations to provide double tax 
relief under the Canadian treaty.  The taxpayer urged the court to harmonize the 
manner of Section 59’s application so that it would not restrict the usage of US 
foreign tax credit relief.  The Tax Court rejected that invitation, and it applied old 
Section 59 without adjustment claiming that the later in time rule applied.29  
Given this holding with respect to the predecessor alternative minimum tax 
regime under old Section 59, it is difficult to imagine that the Tax Court would 
use logic it rejected in Lindsey to find that the successor Section 59A could not be 
applied without restriction as an override to any previously enacted treaty 
obligation. 
To conclude: Contrary to Rosenbloom and Shaheen, for purposes of 
calculating the BEAT, deductions for otherwise deductible payments to related 
persons resident in treaty countries and foreign tax credits for foreign taxes paid 
                                               28	See	Lindsey	v.	Commissioner,		98	T.C.	672	(1992).		29	See	Lindesy	v.	Commissioner,	98	T.C.	672	(1992)	aff’d	mem	(15	F.3d	1160	(D.C.	Cir.	1994).		Professors	Rosenbloom	and	Shaheen	fail	to	explain	why	this	prior	law	do	not	sufficiently	answer	their	objections	with	respect	to	the	interpretive	issues	under	the	successor	alternative	minimum	tax	regime	now	contained	in	Section	59A.		
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to treaty countries should not be allowed. Any argument to the contrary is 
inconsistent with the clear Congressional purpose of enacting the BEAT, which 
was to protect the US tax base from inflated deductions paid to related foreign 
parties that are not subject to US tax jurisdiction.  
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